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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
PAUL RAY SHEFFIELD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
- vs -
JOHN TURNER, Warden of the Utah State 
Prison; STATE OF UTAH; JOHN DOE; 
JOHN DOE; JOHN DOE; JOHN DOE; 
and JOHN DOE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 
10837 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a dismissal of the com-
plaint in an action to recover damages for personal 
injuries. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Hon-
orable Stewart M. Hanson dismissed appellant's 
amended complaint on the grounds that the action 
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was barred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (Supp. 
1967). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents submit that the judgment of dis-
missal should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 6, 1966, while appellant was incarcer-
ated in the Utah State Prison, he was stabbed in the 
eye with a sharp instrument by a fellow inmate. As 
a result, appellant lost the sight in that eye. On No-
vember 25, 1966, appellant commenced a civil action 
against the respondents John Turner and the five 
John Does. On December 8, 1966, the complaint was 
amended to include the State of Utah as a party de-
fendant. The complaint alleged that the warden of 
the Utah State Prison and his authorized agents 
were negligent in supervising the inmates and as a 
result appellant was injured by a fellow inmate. 
Appellant then prayed for judgment against the de-
fendants in the sum of $100,000. 
A motion to dismiss the complaint was filed on 
behalf of the respondents and the matter was argUed 
and heard on January 27, 1967. An order dismissing 
the complaint against all named defendants was en-
tered on January 31, 1967. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISS-
ING APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT AGAINST JOHN 
TURNER AND THE FIVE JOHN DOES IN THAT THEY 
ARE PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO WERE ENGAGED IN 
THE PERFORMANCE OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCT-
ION; THEY DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF AU-
THORITY OF THEIR OFFICES; AND THEY WERE 
THUS IMMUNE FROM CIVIL SUIT. 
Appellant in his brief (p. 9) concedes that Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (Supp. 1967) justifies a dis-
missal of the complaint against the State of Utah. 
Therefore, this court must only decide whether the 
trial court erred in dismissing the complaint as to 
John W. Turner, Warden of the Utah State Prison, 
and the five John Does. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act (herein-
after referred to as the Act) is a statutory expression 
of the common law principle that the sovereign is 
immune from suit. The Act does, however, allow suit 
against the sovereign in certain specific instances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (Supp. 1967) provides: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, 
all governmental entities shall be immune from 
suit for any injury which may result from the ac-
tivities of said entities wherein said entity is en-
gaged in the exercise and discharge of a govern-
mental function. 
Although the Act refers only to "governmental 
entities," respondent submits that the immunity ex-
pressed by the statute extends to officers of a gov-
ernmental unit, so long as such officers are engaged 
in the exercise and discharge of a governmental 
function and so long as they do not exceed the 
scope of power of their particular office. It is re-
spondent's position that the sovereign immunity of 
the state serves as a protection from personal liabil-
ity for governmental officials while they are acting 
within the scope of power of their office. Such posi-
tion is predicated on the fact that the only authority 
under which a governmental official may act is that 
of the governmental unit. Thus, so long as an offi-
cial is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a 
governmental function, and provided that he does 
not exceed the authority of his office, he should be 
entitled to the same immunity from suit as the gov-
ernmental entity. 
The above view is that adopted by the courts 
of the federal system in determining the personal 
liability of officers and employees of the federal gov-
ernment. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); 
Lanq v. Wood, 92 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Greqoire 
v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949); Norton v. Mc-
Shane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964). 
Public policy would seem to require that public 
officials be free from the threat of civil suit if they 
are acting in the course of their employment, and so 
long as they do not exceed the authority of their of-
fice. Public officials should be able to act freely and 
fearlessly in the discharge of their official functions. 
Should this court hold that civil suits may be brought 
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against public officials in their private capacity 
when the act for which suit is brought arises out of 
the discharge of official functions, competent and 
responsible persons will be dissuaded from accept-
ing the responsibilities of public office. And those 
persons holding public office will be less than en-
thusiastic in the performance of their duties. 
The above reasoning is especially applicable in 
the case before this court. Here we are dealing with 
the supervision of convicted felons who, no doubt, 
resent the supervision imposed upon them by the 
state and who will jump at every opportunity to 
harass those charged with their supervision. To al-
low prison inmates to sue the warden and guards 
of a prison in their private capacity for acts occur-
ring within the scope of their employment would 
paralyze the functioning of the penal system, for the 
warden and the guards would be forced to cater to 
the whim and caprice of the inmates or subject them-
selves to numerous civil suits. 
It should be pointed out here that the immunity 
afforded an officer of government under this inter-
pretation applies only where the official is engaged 
in the exercise and discharge of a governmental 
function and only when the scope of authority of his 
office has not been exceeded. Should an officer ex-
ceed the scope of authority of his office, the view 
that the only authority under which he acts is the 
authority of the governmental unit no longer holds 
true and thus the immunity is no longer available. 
Based upon the above reasoning, the respon-
b 
;:ients subrrm mat the lower court did not err m di::s-
missing the complaint as to Tohn Turner and the five 
John Does in that they were goevrnmental officials 
acting within the scope of their authority in dis-
charging a governmental function, and were thus 
protected by the sovereign immunity of the state. 
Respondents submit that even should this court 
decide that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
specifically Utah Code Ann. ~ 63-30-3 (Supp. 1967) 
and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (Supp. 1967), will 
not bear the interpretation as set forth above, the 
reasoning set forth above as to the immunity of the 
governmental entity extending to an official applies 
as a common law principle and constitutes proper 
grounds justifying the dismissal by the lower court 
of the complaints against John Turner and the five 
John Does. 
It is an accepted principle of law that an order 
of a trial court will be sustained if proper grounds 
existed therefor, regardless of the reasons set forth 
by the trial judge. Filipoff v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 
132, 364 ·P.2d 315 (1961); accord. In re Garrison's 
Estate, 59 Nev. 302, 91 P.2d 818 (1939). 
Respondents further submit that the trial court 
committed no error in dismissing the complaint as 
to John Turner and the five John Does in that such 
parties are officers or employees of state govern-
ment and as such are immune from suit for tortious 
conduct, if such conduct occurs in the performance 
of official duties, if such duties are discretionary in 
nature, and if there is no malice or fraud evidenced. 
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See Cander v. Steiner, 225 Md. 271, 170 A.2d 271 
(1961); Gurley v. Brown, 65 Nev. 245, 193 P.2d 693 
(1948); Kisielewski v. State, 68 N.J. Super. 258, 172 
A.2d 203 (1961); Travis v. Pinto, 87 N.J. Super. 263, 
208 A.2d 828 (1965); 43 Am. Jur. Public Officers§ 279 
(1942). 
The immediately above-cited cases all deal with 
suits by inmates of penal institutions for the alleged 
tortious acts of supervising officials. Of particular in-
~erest is Travis v. Pinto, supra. In that case the plaint-
iff sought damages from the superintendent of a 
prison farm and his deputy for injuries received 
when the plaintiff was assaulted by a fellow prison-
er. The Superior Court of New Jersey in holding that 
the plaintiff had no cause of action stated: 
Whether a public officer, or employee, is clothed 
with immunity in the performance or nonperform-
ance of an act in the course of his public service, 
depends upon the nature of his duties and the 
nature and quality of the allegedly tortious act 
or omission with which he is charged. 
It is well recognized in the law that an officer is 
not absolved for his private or personal torts. Pros-
ser on Torts, § 109, p. 780 (1955), and where he 
commits a tort in the performance of official duties 
the question arises of whether his duties are 'dis-
cretionary or quasi- judicial,' in which event he is 
immune from suit, or whether they are 'ministerial,' 
in which event he becomes liable for them regard-
:ess of good faith. Prosser, supra, at pages 781-782. 
The court further stated: 
We think, however, the duties of the appellee [the 
"':Jrden] herein of which complaint is made in the 
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declaration fall within that class which has been 
designated as quasi-judicial, and, as stated above, 
involve the exercise of a considerable latitude of 
discretion. As the chief executive officer of the 
Maryland State Reformatory, he is the custodian of 
its inmates and the proper performance of the 
functions of his office, without detailing his duties, 
requires him to make many decisions that call for 
the exercise of judgment and discretion. When the 
complaint is for the failure to perform or properly 
to perform duties falling within this category, the 
text-writers and cases, while recognizing that judic-
ial officers are liable for the negligent performance 
of purely ministerial duties under some circum-
stances, seem to be in universal accord in holding 
that the public officer is immune from liability, at 
least, in the absence of a showing of malice. Cock-
ing v. Wade, 87 Md. 529, 40 A.104, 40 L.R.A. 628; 
Shearman and Redfield, op. cit., Secs. 324; Cooley, 
op. cit., Sec. 299,300; Harper and James, op. cit., 
Sec. 29.10. 
Generally, an official duty is ministerial when it 
is absolute, certain and imperative, involving mere-
ly execution of a specific duty arising from fixed 
and designated facts. Discretionary or judicial du-
ties are such as necessarily require the exercise of 
reason in the adaptation of the means to an end, 
and discretion in determining how or whether the 
act shall be done or the course pursued. 14 A.L.R.-
2d 357 ( 1950). 
The duties imposed by Repl. Vol. Utah Code 
Ann. § 64-9-13 (1961) and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 64-9-38 (1961) involve the exercise of a consider-
able latitude of discretion. The proper performance 
of both the duties of the warden and the guards re-
quires them to make decisions calling for the exer-
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cise of judgment and discretion. Especially is this 
so where the supervision of prison inmates is con-
cerned. 
Respondent submits that since there was no 
showing of malice, and since John Turner and the 
five John Does were performing discretionary duties 
in the furtherance of official responsibilities, such 
parties are immune from suit; therefore, it was 
proper for the lower court to dismiss. 
The Utah cases cited by appellant in his brief 
can be distinguished from the case at bar in that 
they were all concerned with tortious acts occurring 
where the officer had exceeded the scope of his 
authority or where the officer was performing a 
ministerial act; therefore, such cases are of no help 
in deciding the case now before this court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above-cited cases, it is clear 
that the respondents were immune from suit; thus, 
the trial court committed no error in dismissing the 
amended complaint. Therefore, respondent submits 
that the order of dismissal should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondents 
